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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1953), as amended, whereby a defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital 
felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the Judge John C. Backlund ignored the weight of the 
evidence and made clearly erroneous findings of fact in 
convicting Matthew Auffhammer (hereinafter "Auffhammer") of 
driving under the influence? 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, are reviewed using a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475 (Utah 1990). Case law and 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure give a clear 
directive that in applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of 
review, deference must be given to the opportunity for the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Recently the 
Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this requirement; 
We give deference to the initial decision maker on 
questions of fact because it stands in a superior 
position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence 
and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses/ 
recollections. 
Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 317 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1997) . 
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In order for Auffhammer to show clear error, he must first 
present all of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings 
and then "demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack." Moosman at 476. 
For an appellate court to hold a finding clearly erroneous, 
the trial court,s findings of fact must be "against the great 
weight of evidence" or the reviewing court must be "definitely 
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful v. 
Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. (See addendum for full text.) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(2) (1953), as amended 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On the evening of June 30, 1996, Auffhammer went out looking 
for an apartment, but ended up at a gathering that was described 
as an "alcohol party". (Tr. at 22, 26-27, attached as an 
addendum to Appellants brief.) Over a period of several hours 
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at this party, Auffhammer was seen drinking alcoholic beverages, 
(Tr. at 27, 38, 52.) Auffhammer met Garth Rasmussen (hereinafter 
"Rasmussen") at this party and eventually the two men left the 
party together, as Auffhammer was going to let Rasmussen spend 
the night at his home in Alpine, Utah. (Tr. at 27, 29-30.) 
As they traveled toward Alpine, Auffhammer was slow to react 
to one stop sign, starting to stop and then passing by the stop 
sign a little, which caused his passenger to be critical of his 
driving. (Tr. at 58-59.)l Shortly thereafter, Auffhammer ¥as 
speeding at approximately forty miles an hour in a twenty—five 
mile per hour zone as he approached the "T" intersection of 1300 
West and 2600 North in Pleasant Grove. (Tr. at 30-31, 32, 54.) 
The stop sign posted at the intersection was clearly visible that 
night. (Tr. at 14, 76-75.) However, Auffhammer failed to stop 
at the stop sign, (Tr. at 31-32), and his vehicle careened across 
2600 North, a major byway in the area, jumped a ditch (Tr. at 
32), and crashed into a vehicle parked in the driveway of a home 
across the road from the stop sign. (Tr. at 45.) TThen 
Auffhammer7s car finally came to rest, approximately 15 feet away 
from the parked vehicle that Auffhammer had struck, (Tr. at 17-
18), both Auffhammer and his passenger were momentarily 
unconscious and there was extensive damage to both vehicles. 
(Tr. at 11, 33, 45-46.) After a short time had passed, Rasmussen 
xThe record is unclear whether Auffhammer ever came to a 
complete stop at the first stop sign. 
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regained consciousness and awoke Auffhammer. (Tr. at 33-34, 45.) 
The two men, injured and bleeding from the crash, exited the car. 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 30, 1996, Brad Bryan, the 
owner of the home and the parked car that Auffhammer collided 
with, was awakened by the sudden sound of a crash. (Tr. at 68.) 
Mr. Bryan did not hear any brakes squealing, gravel skidding, or 
any other similar type of sound other than the sudden crashing 
noise of Auffhammer's car as it impacted the vehicle parked ±n 
the driveway. (Tr. at 69.) Mr. Bryan walked out to find his car 
"basically" demolished. (Tr. at 70). He also saw Auffhammer and 
Rasmussen standing next to the other car, talking. (Tr. at 70-
71.) His first impression was that the two men had been 
drinking. (Tr. at 74.) Mr. Bryan later testified that there was 
"really no question in [his] mind that they been drinking." (Tr. 
at 74, lines 4-7.) From where he was, Mr. Bryan did not detect 
the odor of alcohol, (Tr. at 78), but he did notice that both men 
were groggy, their speech was a bit slurred, and they were having 
a tough time holding themselves up. (Tr. at 74.) Mr. Bryan went 
back into his home to call the police. 
At about this time, Auffhammer told his passenger "let's get 
out of here." (Tr.. at 34, 36*) Despite Rasmussen's efforts to 
convince Auffhammer to stay at^ the scene of the crash, Auffhammer 
stammered some "incoherent" statements and ran off without 
waiting to talk to either the owner of the parked vehicle or the 
police. (Tr. at 36-37, 71.) When Mr. Bryan returned after 
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calling the police, only Rasmussen remained at the scene, (Tr. 
at 71.) 
A short time later, Officer Michael Smith responded to the 
accident. (Tr. at 10.) He interviewed Rasmussen, who identified 
himself as the passenger. Officer Smith was unable to talk with 
Auffhammer at that time because Auffhammer had left the accident 
scene. (Tr. at 18, 21.) In speaking to Officer Smith, Rasmussen 
made statements to the effect that he had met Auffhammer at an 
"alcohol party", (Tr. at 27), that Auffhammer was traveling r^t H 
high rate of speed, (Tr. at 3 0-31), and that Auffhammer was 
intoxicated ^andthat Rasmussen knew lie should never have gotten 
into the car with him. (Tr. at 31.) Rasmussen «al€o complained 
of injuries to his back and arm and,Officer Smith discovered 
quite a bit of blood in both the driver's and passenger's 
compartments of Auffhammer/s car. (Tr. at 18-19.) 
The next day Officer Jared Clark interviewed Auffhammer at 
the American Fork hospital. (Tr. at 60-61.) Officer Clark read 
Auffhammer his Miranda rights, (Tr. at 62), and inquired into the 
injuries Auffhammer had sustained. (Tr. at 62-63.) Auffhammer 
responded that he had been walking in a field and hit his head. 
(Tr. at 63.) Officer Clark then asked Auffhammer if he had been 
in an accident and whether or not he had been drinking the night 
before. Auffhammer answered no to both questions. (Id.) 
Officer Clark then asked if Auffhammer knew that his friend had 
been hurt in the accident, to which Auffhammer responded that 
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Rasmussen was not his friend, but that he was just giving him a 
ride home, (Id.) 
On July 3, 1997, Officer Smith went to Auffhammer's home to 
speak with him about the accident. (Tr. at 21.) After reading 
Auffhammer his Miranda rights, Officer Smith asked him about the 
accident, to which Auffhammer responded that he did not remember 
getting in an accident. (Tr.at 22.) When Auffhammer was asked 
about injuries that were apparent on his body, he answered that 
he had received them as a result of the accident. (Tr. at 23^) 
When told about the statements Rasmussen had made, Auffhammer 
denied them, stating that he had not been drinking that night and 
that he did not even drink alcohol. (Tr. at 22-23.) 
Approximately two weeks before the trial, Auffhammer 
contacted Rasmussen and talked "a little bit" to him about his 
testimony. (Tr. at 53-55.) 
At the trial, Auffhammer argued that there was not enough 
evidence to conclude he was under the influence or that his 
xiriving was impaired. (Tr* at 87.) Judge Backlund found 
otherwise. (Tr. at 89.) Even though at trial Rasmussen 
unequivocally answered "yes" to the prosecutor/s question 
regarding if, at the party, he had seen Auffhammer "drinking any 
alcoholic beverages", (Tr. at 27), Judge Backlund found 
Rasmussen7s testimony to be "substantially" hedged and toned down 
from the statements made to the police. To the court, this 
seemed to be a result of Auffhammer's recent contact with 
Rasmussen and Rasmussen's desire to let "bygones be bygones". 
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(Tr. at 91-92.) Also, the court pointed out the flawed logic in 
Auffhammer,s claim that he was so affected by his injuries as to 
render him insensible, and yet he was able to walk several miles 
in the dark to find the hospital. (Tr. at 93.) Judge Backlund 
also found it "almost ludicrous" to think that Auffhammer did not 
know the road, a major byway in the area, did not go through. 
(Tr. at 90-91.) The court also found the obvious lies Auffhammer 
told to the police to be a major factor that indicated his 
intention to cover up an intoxicated state and avoid a conviction 
for DUI, as there would be no other reason for Auffhammer izo 
leave the scene and then to lie about his involvement in the 
accident. (Tr. at 89-90, 92-93.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While Auffhammer has marshaled portions of the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings of fact, he has failed to 
marshal all of the evidence as required under the standard of 
review. Case law has established that when an appellant 
challenges a trial court's findings of fact but fails to marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the findings there arises a 
presumption that the record supports the trial court's findings 
of fact and that those findings will not be disturbed by the 
appellate court. 
A major portion of the trial court's decision was based on 
Judge Backlund's determination of the witnesses' credibility. As 
a finder of fact, Judge Backlund properly used his ability to 
view the demeanor of the witnesses and to assess the live 
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testimony at trial to formulate his findings of fact. Both case 
law and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure give a 
clear directive that deference must be given to the fact finder's 
superior position to assess witnesses7 testimony. Therefore, 
this Court should hold that Judge Backlund's findings are not 
clearly erroneous and should uphold Auffhammer/s conviction. 
Finally, Auffhammer/s failure to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the^trial court's findings precludes his claim of 
insufficient evidence, as such a failure gives rise to the 
presumption that the record supports the trial court's finding, 
-However, even if the record is reviewed, there is more than 
sufficient evidence to support Judge Backlund's findings. An 
appellant contesting findings must set forth all evidence the 
trial court heard in the light most favorable to the findings in 
dispute, Auffhammer has not, and cannot, meet the burden of 
proving that the evidence presented during the trial was 
insufficient to support the trial court findings, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In challenging the findings of fact, Auffhammer has a heavy 
burden. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), 
findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous." To prove that a finding is "clearly erroneous" an 
appellant must "first marshal all of' the evidence supporting the 
finding," Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins, Co., 766 P.2d 896, 899 
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(Utah 1989) (emphasis added, see Addendum). This requirement of 
marshaling the evidence is an important function that reminds 
both the "litigants and the appellate courts of the broad 
deference owed to the fact finder at trial." State v. Moore, 802 
P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Because of the important function marshaling plays in 
reviewing a trial court's findings of facts, all of the evidence 
supporting the findings must be marshaled or the courts will 
presume the trial court's findings to be supported by the record. 
Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 3 0 {Utah 
1997); Macris & Assoc, v. Images & Attitudef 319 Utah -Adv^  Uep^ 
33, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). An appellant cannot simply present 
a portion of the evidence and then argue the evidence is 
insufficient. If there is a failure to marshal all of the 
evidence, the court will assume the record supports the trial 
court and will not, therefore, disturb the lower court's factual 
findings. Macris, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
In his brief, Auffhammer marshaled some of the evidence 
presented at trial that supports Judge Backlund's findings* 
However, Auffhammer has not met the heavy burden he faces in that 
he failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings. The following is a compilation of facts 
supporting Judge Backlund's finding that Auffhammer failed to 
present in his brief. 
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1. Rasmussen admitted that when first questioned by the 
police, he had described the party he and Auffhammer had attended 
as an "alcohol party". (Tr. at 22, 26-27.) 
2. Rasmussen unequivocally testified that while at the 
"alcohol party," he had seen Auffhammer drinking alcoholic 
beverages (Tr. at 27). 
3. Rasmussen testified he told the police that on the way 
home from the party, Auffhammer was traveling at a high rate of 
speed. (Tr. at 3 0). 
4. Rasmussen testified that Auffhammer had "started to 
stop but, he passed the stop sign a little bit" at a previous 
stop sign before the intersection where the accident occurred. 
(Tr. at 59.) 
5. Rasmussen testified that Auffhammer was slow to react 
to the stop sign at the "T" intersection at 13 00 West 2 600 North 
that night. (Tr. at 31, 32.) 
6. Both Officer Smith and Mr. Bryan testified that, on the 
night of the crash, the stop sign at the intersection was clearly 
visible from some distance back. (Tr. at 14, 76-77.) 
7* Mr. Bryan testified there was no sound of tires 
braking, skidding on gravel, or the like, but only the sudden 
sound of the crash as,. Auff hammer's car impacted the vehicle 
parked in the driveway. (Tr. at 69. ) 2 
2The testimony that there were no sounds consistent with 
someone trying to react to a stop sign or intersection suggests 
that the driver totally failed to respond to the stop sign, a 
fact the judge could consider in determining whether the driver's 
reflexes were impaired and whether he was able to safely operate 
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8. Officer Smith testified that after impact, the parked 
car came to rest approximately 15 feet from Auffhammer/s vehicle 
(Tr. at 17-18), suggesting by the force of the impact that 
Auffhammer was slow to react after passing the stop sign, the 
intersection, and a ditch. 
9. Rasmussen testified that he tried to persuade 
Auffhammer to stay, but that Auffhammer "took off basically" 
(Tr. at 36), clearly indicating Auffhammer wanted to avoid being 
identified at the scene so shortly after he had been to an 
"alcohol party." 
J.O. . When questioned about his statements to the police on 
that night of the accident, Rasmussen said he "very well could 
have" said that Auffhammer was very intoxicated or quite 
intoxicated, and that it would have been the truth (Tr. at 53). 
11. Rasmussen testified that Auffhammer had contacted him a 
couple of weeks before the hearing and that Auffhammer had asked 
him about his testimony (Tr at 53, 54.), which would explain why, 
at trial, the witness seemed hesitant to testify or attempted to 
hedge in his answers to questions regarding his earlier 
statements to the police. 
12. Officer Carter testified that when he asked Auffhammer 
if he had been in an accident and if he had been drinking, 
Auffhammer told him no. But that when he asked if Auffhammer 
knew his friend had been injured in the accident, Auffhammer 
a motor vehicle. 
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responded by saying it was not his friend, he was just giving him 
a ride home. (Tr. at 63.) 
13. Officer*Smith testified that Auffhammer told him^he 
could not remember the accident and that Auffhammer did not even 
drink alcohol. (Tr. at 22.) 
14. Mr. Bryan testified that when he first observed 
Auffhammer and Rasmussen at the time of the accident, his 
impression was that both men had been drinking. (Tr. at 74.) 
15. Mr. Bryan emphasized his perception that the two men 
were intoxicated, by stating there was "really no question in 
[his] mind that they had been drinking." (Id.) 
All of these points support Judge Backlund's finding that 
Auffhammer had been drinking and that he was impaired on the 
night of the accident. However, it is Auffhammer's burden, not 
Pleasant Grove's, to demonstrate how the record supports Judge 
Backlund's findings. Because Auffhammer has failed to fully 
marshal the evidence supporting^the trial court's findings, it is 
proper for this Court to presume the record supports the findings 
and to deny Auffhammer's request to reverse his conviction. 
POINT II 
DUE REGARD MUST BE GIVEN TO JUDGE mCKLTJND'B 
OPPORTUNITY TO JUDGE THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes it 
clear that the appellate courts are to give respect and due 
regard to the ability of the fact finder to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The ability to watch witnesses testify and to 
note their demeanor provides an advantage to the trial court that 
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cannot be reproduced thereafter, even through the most skillfully 
crafted brief. Determining facts is a primary function of the 
trial court, and relevant case law makes it clear that this 
function should be treated with deference, especially when based 
on evaluation of conflicting live testimony. In re S.T.. 923 P.2d 
393, 399 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting In re Estate of Bartell, 
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this standard 
of review and the importance of the deference given to the trial 
court's findings of fact, stating that the trial court is in a 
"superior position from which to evaluate and weigh the evitlsnce 
and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses' 
recollections." Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utahf Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 4 (Utah 1997). 
Although a trial court is not required to recite each 
indicia of reasoning that leads to its conclusions or explain why 
it found certain witnesses less credible, In re S.T. 923 P.2d at 
399, Judge Backlund explained that his perception of Rasmussen's 
testimony was a major factor in formulating his findings of fact. 
(Tr. at 91-91.) The finding that Rasmussen was substantially 
hedging and changing liis testimony from earlier statements made 
to the police and that he had been influenced by communications 
Auffhammer had made with him only a few weeks earlier are exactly 
the types of credibility judgments that must be given deference 
upon review because of the "superior position" of the trial court 
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"to assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses"• Drake, 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. 
Judge Backlund also had to judge the credibility of 
statements made by Mr. Bryan that Auffhammer had slurred speech 
and seemed intoxicated, (Tr. at 74), compared to testimony from 
Rasmussen that Auffhammer/s speech was not slurred. (Tr. at 40.) 
Again, Judge Backlund's ability to listen to live testimony and 
to judge the credibility of these two witnesses places him in the 
best position to determine what the facts really are. 
Judge Backlund's decisions regarding the credibility of the 
witnesses had a strong impact on his findings of fact. 43iven the 
due regard and deference to his function as a finder of fact, 
this Court must be "definitely and firmly convinced" that Judge 
Backlund made a mistake that is against the full weight of the 
evidence before it overturns his findings of fact. Enalert v. 
Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Nothing in the 
trial would give rise to such a "definite conviction" that Judge 
Backlund made such a mistake. This Court should give deference 
to Judge Backlund7s findings and affirm the conviction of 
Auffhammer. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT JUDGE BACKLUND'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE 
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Auffhammer claims that there is not enough evidence to show 
Auffhammer was under the influence of alcohol or that his driving 
was thereby impaired. However, he has failed to completely 
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marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings. Since Auffhammer has failed to show the evidence 
insufficient even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
court's findings, his assertion of a lack of evidence must be 
rejected and the record must be presumed to support the trial 
court's findings. Heber City Corpf 319 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30; 
Macris, 319 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
Nevertheless, when the record is reviewed there is more than 
sufficient evidence to support Judge Backlund's findings and 
judgment that Auffhammer was guilty of DUI. It is not disputed 
that Auffhammer was driving the car when it crashed into Mr. 
Bryan's parked vehicle. (Tr. at 87.) There is testimony that 
Auffhammer had been drinking alcohol a short time prior to the 
accident, (Tr. at 27, 55), that he had problems stopping at 
another stop sign shortly before the accident, (Tr. at 59), and 
that he was slow to react to the stop sign at the intersection 
immediately in front of the scene of the accident. (Tr. at 31-
32.) At the scene of the accident, Rasmuss-en told police that 
Auffhammer was intoxicated and that Rasmussen should have never 
gotten into the car with Auffhammer. (Tr. at 22.) 
In his brief, Auffhammer focuses on two elements of the 
offense of DUI as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (1996 
Supp.) and claims these elements were not established at trial. 
The first element is that the defendant was "under the influence 
of alcohol." Auffhammer then describes the second element as 
"whether that influence rendered him 'incapable of operating a 
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vehicle7." (Appellants brief at 9.) However, a closer reading 
of the statute shows that the prosecution need not prove the 
defendant incapable of operating a vehicle, but rather only that 
the defendant is "incapable of safely operating a vehicle." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2). (Emphasis added.) 
Sufficient evidence was submitted to, and reviewed by, the 
trial court to find both elements necessary for a DUI conviction. 
Testimony at trial provided sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's findings of facts. That evidence showed that on 
the evening of June 30, 1996, Auffhammer attended an "alcohol 
party" for a period of several hours, during which time he was 
seen drinking alcoholic beverages. Auffhammer left the party 
with Rasmussen, who at the time recognized Auffhammer's 
impairment. Rasmussen later testified as to the events of that 
night. As those two men traveled from the party, Auffhammer was 
driving. During that drive, Auffhammer exceeded the speed limit 
and was slow to stop at one stop sign, which concerned his 
passenger. 
As Auffhammer approached the "T" intersection of 1300 West 
and 2600 North in Pleasant Grove, the stop sign should have been 
apparent to him. Others testified it was clearly visible that 
night. However, Auffhammer failed to stop at the stop sign. He 
sped through the intersection, jumped a ditch, and crashed into a 
vehicle parked in the driveway of the home across the road from 
the stop sign. Auffhammer's vehicle struck the parked vehicle 
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with such force that the second car came to rest approximately 15 
feet away from the point of impact. 
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 30, 1996, Brad Bryan, the 
owner of the home across from the intersection, was awakened by 
the sudden sound of a crash. He did not recall hearing brakes 
squealing or a car skidding, which one would expect if a person 
had missed a stop sign at a "T" intersection. Mr. Bryan only 
heard the sudden crash of Auffhammer's car impacting Mr. Bryan's 
vehicle. Mr. Bryan walked out, saw what had happened, and -saw 
Auffhammer and Rasmussen. There was "really no question in Ihis] 
mind that they been drinking." (Tr. at 74, lines 4-7.) Mr. Bryan 
noticed that both men were groggy, their speech was a bit 
slurred, and they were having a tough time holding themselves up. 
While Mr. Bryan was in the house calling the police, 
Auffhammer stammered some "incoherent" statements and fled the 
scene. Rasmussen remained at the scene. When Officer Michael 
Smith spoke with Rasmussen at the scene, that witness stated that 
Auffhammer was intoxicated and that Rasmussen knew he should 
never have gotten into the car with him. Rasmussen/s testimony 
was less direct at the time of trial, which the judge attributed 
to his having had a conversation with the defendant shortly 
before the trial. 
When Auffhammer was located at the American Fork Hospital, 
he told Officer Jared Clark that he had been walking in a field 
and hit his head, and that he had not been drinking or in an 
accident the night before. However, Auffhammer then indicated 
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that Rasmussen was not his friend, he was just giving him a ride 
home. Later, Auffhammer told police his injuries resulted from 
the accident• Based on these and other questionable statements 
by Auffhammer, the court found his version of the events 
unbelievable, and instead relied more on the testimony of 
Rasmussen and the officers. 
Judge Backlund's. findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, 
but are instead supported by the evidence. Auffhammer has not 
met, and cannot meet, his heavy burden of proving the evidence 
insufficient to support the findings. This is especially true as 
the record is to be viewed in the light most favorable to Judge 
Backlund's findings of fact. Reid 766 P.2d at 899. 
Contrary to the Auffhammer/s assertion that the trial court 
"convicted him of the DUI because 'Auffhammer is a liar/n, 
(Appellant's brief at 7), both the testimony presented and the 
reasonable inferences from the evidence before the court support 
the trial court's findings that Auffhammer had been drinking on 
the night in question, that he was driving immediately 
thereafter, and that he was impaired to the point of not being 
able to safely operate his motor vehicle. 
CQNCLTJSTON 
Auffhammer,s request that this Court overturn his conviction 
for driving under the influence should be denied for three 
reasons. First, Auffhammer failed to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings of fact. Therefore this 
Court should assume that the record supports Judge Backlund's 
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findings. Second, because the factual findings were based on 
live testimony and influenced by the lack of credibility of both 
Auffhammer and Rasmussen, this Court should give deference to 
Judge Backlund,s judgment, as directed by both case law and Rule 
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and affirm 
Auffhammer's conviction. 
Finally, Auffhammer has failed to show that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support Judge Backlund,s findings of 
fact. Even though it should be assumed that the record supports 
Judge Backlund's findings because Auffhammer failed to marshal 
all of the evidence, a review of the record in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings reveals there is more 
than sufficient evidence to support those findings. 
Pleasant Grove requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's findings of fact and uphold Matthew Auffhammer's 
conviction for driving under the influence and leaving the scene 
of an accident. 
DATED, September l^-— IQQ-7 
Attorney for the City of Pleasant Grove 
_, _ t ^ ^ , 
C. Val 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ Rule 52(a) 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; 
in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court 
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings 
of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in 
open court following the close of evidence or appear in an 
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the <x>urt. The 
trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when 
the motion is based on more than one ground. 
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